Abstract. We present two new compilers that generically turn passively secure key exchange protocols (KE) into authenticated key exchange protocols (AKE) where security also holds in the presence of active adversaries. Security is shown in a very strong security model where the adversary is also allowed to i) reveal state information of the protocol participants and ii) launch theoretically and practically important PKI-related attacks that model important classes of unknown-key share attacks. Although the security model is much stronger, our compilers are more efficient than previous results with respect to many important metrics like the additional number of protocol messages and moves, the additional computational resources required by the compiler or the number of additional primitives applied. Moreover, we advertise a mechanism for implicit key confirmation. From a practical point of view, the solution is simple and efficient enough for authenticated key exchange. In contrast to previous results, another interesting aspect that we do not require that key computed by the key exchange protocol is handed over to the compiler what helps to avoid additional and costly modifications of existing KE-based systems.
Introduction
Authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols are among the most important building blocks of secure network protocols. They allow a party A to i) authenticate a communication partner B and ii) securely establish a common session key with B. In many existing systems both of these tasks are addressed by a single protocol. This can yield very efficient solutions. However, there are several supported by secure eMobility grant number 01ME12025. supported by EPSRC grant number EP/G013829/1. scenarios where these two tasks are actually addressed by separate protocols. For example in typical browser-based applications, the user relies on TLS to exchange a session key k with an authenticated server. The user, on the other hand, often uses a simple username/password combination which is encrypted with k to authenticate himself. In this paper, we consider generic and very efficient constructions that securely combine authentication protocols (AP) and passively secure key exchange protocols (KE) to yield authenticated key exchange.
While combined solutions may be more efficient in general, there are several advantages for the modular design of AKE systems. One is flexibility as one can resort to a rich collection of existing authentication and key exchange protocols that can be combined to yield new AKE systems which are specifically crafted to fit a certain application scenario. The second reason is applicability, as a generic compiler (ideally) does not require any modifications in existing implementations of the input protocols (which are often costly or error-prone in practice). Instead, security can be established by simply 'adding' the implementation of the compiler to the system. Third, a generic compiler can considerably simplify the security analysis, as only the input protocols have to be analysed to meet their respective security requirements. Security of the entire AKE protocol follows from the security proof of the compiler. This greatly pays off in the setting of key exchange protocols, as here, we usually only require the underlying key exchange protocol to be passively secure (which is a comparably simple security notion) while the output protocol must be secure even under active attacks (where the adversary is granted several additional attack capabilities). Finally, generic compilers may help to lower the assumptions on practical security protocols which have not been designed with provable security in mind and where a proof of AKE is not known. If such protocols are used in higher-level systems it is typically simply assumed that they constitute secure AKE systems. If we apply a generic compiler to such a protocol we can relax the security assumption to only requiring that the protocol is secure in the presence of passive adversaries.
Contribution
We present two very efficient compilers that construct secure AKE systems from authentication protocols (AP) and passively secure key exchange protocols (KE). To the best of our knowledge, they are the first such compilers that are efficient and truly generic, i.e. they do not require any modifications in the underlying AP and KE protocols. Thus, they are easily applicable to existing systems, what makes them very useful in practice. For example, imagine a wide-spread network software which internally consists of an initial key exchange protocol call that computes a session key k. Next, the software directly applies a symmetric primitive which uses k as the corresponding key. By design, the application does not provide any mechanism to output the security-critical session key to any other software. An ideal compiler should treat the entire network application as black-box except for the fact that the key exchange protocol is an interactive protocol and any party in the network can obtain the transcript of the protocol execution. Previous compilers require costly modifications on the key exchange protocol such that either the messages have to be modified or the secret session key k also has to be output to the compiler. A new session key is computed using e.g. the requested key derivation function (KDF), i.e. the compilers require the session key of the underlying key exchange KE protocol as input. We stress that in some scenarios it is very difficult or impossible (for example because the network application is closed-source) to realize these modifications. Our compilers, in contrast, avoid such problems as they only require the public transcript of the key exchange protocol but not the secret session key from the passively secure KE protocol as input. Our compilers are very efficient but restrict the class of KE protocols to those which do not rely on long-term keys. We have chosen to restrict our attention to this class of key exchange protocols because they i) allow for efficient protocols with very high security guarantees (like forward secrecy) and ii) they can efficiently be recognized. Let us elaborate on this. As a consequence of our restriction long-term keys are only used in the authentication protocol, whereas in the KE protocol, all values are freshly drawn in each new communication session. We stress that important key exchange mechanisms like ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange fall into this class.
1 Our restriction is useful to design protocols with forward secrecy, which states that even after the compromise of long-term keys previously executed sessions remain secure. The same restriction (that requires the KE protocol without long-term key) 2 is made on the KE protocols which are used in the recent compiler by Jager, Kohlar, Schäge, and Schwenk (JKSS) [8] . The well-known compiler by Katz and Yung (KY) uses a slightly different approach by directly requiring that the input protocol provides forward secrecy [11] .
We present two compilers each of which relies on a different authentication mechanism. Our first compiler is very efficient. It relies on signature schemes and only requires two additional moves in which signatures are exchanged. The second compiler relies on public key encryption systems, one-time message authentication schemes, and collision resistant hash functions. Although the first compiler is more efficient, the second compiler accounts for scenarios where the parties do not have (certified) signature keys but only encryption keys. This can often occur in practice. For example, the most efficient (for the client) and most wide-spread key exchange mechanism in TLS is RSA key transport. Here the server certificate only contains an RSA encryption key. The latter can be extended to symmetric-based authentication systems in which the communication parties have secure pre-shared keys.
In this paper, we focus on practicality and efficiency of our solutions. We stress that we could generalize our compiler in a straight-forward way to also work with a general class of authentication protocols. The JKSS compiler has made a first step in that direction by proposing an abstract class of authentication schemes called tag-based authentication scheme (TBAS) that can be used in the JKSS compiler. However, the encryption-based authentication mechanism of our second compiler is not covered by this abstract description. This is mainly because the TBAS definition of the JKSS does not account for verifiers with secret state information. In terms of efficiency, the recent JKSS compiler is less efficient than any of our compilers as it additionally requires two random nonces, two MAC values to be exchanged (it's too costly for data transmission) and an additional computation of the new session key for authenticated key exchange. All our solutions work in the standard model, i.e. without assuming random oracles.
Technical Contribution. Our efficiency improvements rely on the following techniques. First, we do not use explicit key confirmation to thwart unknown-key share attacks. Instead we use a form of implicit key confirmation where we include the identities of the partners in the messages that are authenticated. At the same time, this helps to also counter strong attacks that an adversary might launch with the help of the extended attack capabilities (state reveals and PKIbased attacks) of our strong security model. In terms of efficiency, this helps us to save the exchange of two MAC values (as compared to the JKSS compiler). As our second efficiency improvement, we formally show that for security we do not have to exchange uniformly random nonces after the key exchange protocol as in the JKSS compiler. In the JKSS compiler these nonces are solely used to make every session's transcript unique. We can prove that instead it is sufficient to use the public ephemeral keys which are exchanged in the key exchange protocol. Technically, we show that if a key exchange protocol that does not rely on long-term keys is passively secure, then with negligible probability there are no collisions among the ephemeral public keys. This is sufficient to show that even in the presence of active attackers each transcript is unique as long as one party is uncorrupted. Finally, our efficient compilers only require the public transcript of the key exchange protocol, denoted here as KE, but not the secret key k KE from KE as input. Our approach helps us to save the additional computation of a new session key for authenticated key exchange (as compared to previous compiler). In other words, our compilers require no cryptographic session key generator other than KE itself.
The Security Model
Our proofs of our compilers hold in two very strong security models respectively. These models rely on the concept of indistinguishability of session keys which first emerged in the seminal work of Bellare and Rogaway [2] and later extended by [6, 18] to the public key setting. However, our model substantially extends these models. In contrast to previous works, we explicitly model the revelation of state information of sessions (via a RevealState query) and strong and practical PKI-based attacks (via a RegCorruptParty query) like the public key substitution attack (PKS) [4, 16] or the duplicate-signature key selection (DSKS) attack [16, 12] . We believe that the revelation of state information is much more realistic than (just) the revelation of keys. To model strong and practical PKI-related attacks we use the RegCorruptParty query into our models that allows attackers to register adversarially chosen public keys and identities. Observe that the adversary does not have to know the corresponding secret key. In practice, most certification authorities (CAs) do not require the registrant to deliver proofs of knowledge of the secret key. Using RegCorruptParty query the adversary may easily register a public key which has already been registered by another honest user U . Since the public keys are equal, all the signatures that are produced by U can be re-used by the adversary. Such attacks can have serious security effects [4, 16, 12] . Our model also formalizes perfect forward secrecy. Forward secrecy is a very strong form of security which guarantees that past sessions remain secure even if the long-term keys get exposed in later sessions. We use a formal definition of forward secrecy that is adopted from [10] .
Related Work
In 1998, Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk (BCK) were the first to consider a modular way for the development of AKE [1] . They propose to first design a protocol in the authenticated link model, an idealized model where the links between parties are always authenticated. Then they systematically transform the protocol into a protocol which is also secure in the unauthenticated link model, in which the adversary has control over all the message flows in the network, by applying a so-called authenticator. Basically, for every message A needs to transmit to B there will be some additional communication with B in which B sends a random nonce to A and A responds with an application of an authentication mechanism on this nonce (in a challenge-response like fashion). For example, when instantiated with a signature scheme or with a combination of an encryption system and a message authentication code, the authenticator adds another two messages to every message sent in the original protocol. Altogether, this amounts for a 200% increase in the number of moves of the protocol and the number of messages sent. Also, because of the (asymmetric) authentication mechanism every party needs considerable additional resources to compute and verify authenticators.
In 2003, Katz and Yung presented a generic compiler for group key agreement [11] . The KY compiler first adds an initial round to a passively secure group key exchange protocol where each party chooses a random nonce and broadcasts it to its communication partner. In the next step, the compiler basically adds to every message of the original protocol a signature which is also computed over all the random values that have been computed in the first phase. Their idea can be understood as a generalization of the the BCK compiler to the group key exchange setting where they take a passively secure group key agreement protocol and turn it into an actively secure one. When restricted to the two-party case, this compiler is much more efficient in terms of protocol moves, in contrast to the BCK compiler, each message sent does not need to be authenticated interactively. The KY compiler only accounts for a single round that is added to the input protocol. However, the compiler still modifies each message sent in the protocol by basically adding a signature to that message. As before, this approach amounts for a huge decrease in efficiency due to the additional signature generation and verification operations each user has to execute. Additionally KY show that the famous group key exchange protocol by Burmester-Desmedt [5] fulfills their notion of passive security. (In the two party case, however, it basically reduces to the standard ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol). The KY compiler outputs protocols which guarantee forward secrecy. However, it does require that the input group key protocols already provide forward secrecy. This assumption is similar to our (and the JKSS) assumption on the KE protocol to not rely on long-term keys. Our restriction is, in some sense rougher than that of KY but it allows for a very simple verification by inspection. We stress that we could adapt the KY definition and yield a slightly more general result. We think, however, that in scenarios where a complex, practical protocol is given it might be hard to inspect if the KY compiler is applicable at all. This would make the compiler less useful when we apply it to relax the security assumptions on a particular key exchange mechanism (from AKE to KE security). Intuitively, our approach implies forward-secrecy because if all values which are used to generate the session keys are freshly computed in each session of the passively secure key exchange protocol then the keys computed in the different sessions are independent. This intuition is formalized in the security proofs of the subsequent sections. In 2010 Jager et al. presented the first compiler which accounts only for a constant number of additional messages (which is independent of the KE protocol) to be exchanged [8] , denoted here as JKSS compiler. In terms of efficiency, this compiler is closest to our results. Basically, the compiler, after executing the KE protocol, makes A and B additionally exchange 1) random nonces, 2) signatures over these nonces and the KE transcript and 3) two MAC values (using a MAC-key K mac generated using the session key from the passively secure KE protocol) which have been computed over all the previous messages. As mentioned above this compiler is less efficient than our solution. At the same time all of the above compilers do neither consider state reveals nor PKI-related attacks in their security analysis.
Security Assumptions 3 Preliminaries and Definitions
Let [n] = {1, . . . , n} ⊂ N be the set of integers between 1 and n. We write a $ ← S to denote the action of sampling a uniformly random element a from a set S. Let '||' denote the operation concatenating two binary strings. Let IDS denote an identity space associated with security parameter κ.
Key Exchange Protocols
A two party key-exchange (KE) protocol is a protocol that enables those two parties to compute a shared secret key. In the following, we formally provide a very technical definition of KE which is more detailed than in most other works. This is solely for the purpose of deriving a technical result on general KE protocols without long-term keys. In other words, we require that every secret keys used to generate the session keys must be chosen freshly in each session. For simplicity we first focus on the practically most important class of two-move key exchange protocols. We stress that our definitions and results can easily be generalized to y-move key exchange protocols as sketched below.
A key exchange scheme KE = (KE.Setup, KE.EKGen, KE.SKGen) consists of three algorithms which may be called by a party ID ∈ IDS in each session. Let M KE be the message space and ESK be the space for ephemeral secret key and EPK be the space for ephemeral public key. Let T be the transcript of all messages exchanged in a KE protocol instance (see Figure 1 ).
This probabilistic polynomial time algorithm takes as input the security parameter κ and outputs a set of system parameters pms ke . The parameters pms ke might be implicitly used by other algorithms for simplicity.
The probabilistic polynomial time algorithm takes as input the system parameters pms ke and message in ∈ M KE and outputs an ephemeral key pair (esk ID , epk ID ), where esk ID ∈ ESK and epk ID ∈ EPK, and a message m ID ∈ M KE that requires to be sent in a protocol move. The execution of this algorithm might be determined by the input message (in) which could be any information including for example identities of session participants, ephemeral public key or just empty string ∅. If m ID = ∅, for simplicity we may write (esk ID , epk ID )
The session key generator is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm which takes as input esk ID of a session participant ID and transcript T of all messages exchanged in this session, and outputs a session key k.
Correctness. We say a correct key exchange protocol without long-term key if for any protocol instance with session key generated as k := KE.SKGen(esk ID , T ) it holds that esk ID is generated freshly by KE.EKGen in corresponding protocol instance. That is, each party computes each session key using only ephemeral secret key which is freshly generated by KE.EKGen in corresponding protocol instance. We consider key exchange protocols with perfect correctness that is
We observe that in a passively secure key exchange protocol where we do not rely on long-term keys it is necessary that the values epk ID1 and epk ID2 are nonempty and 'meaningful'. This is because both parties have to keep the session key secret from a curious adversary. For example in ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange (EDH) [7] , the KE.EKGen is executed without any additional message, i.e. in 1 = in 2 = ∅, and the generated messages such that m ID1 = epk ID1 and m ID2 = epk ID2 . In some KE protocols, the KE algorithms of the initiator ID 1 can be very different from those of the responder ID 2 like for example in encrypted key transport with freshly chosen key material (FEKT), in which case we could instantiate those messages in Figure 1 as: in 1 = ∅, in 2 = m ID1 = epk ID1 . We stress that the key pairs (esk ID1 , epk ID1 ) and (esk ID2 , epk ID2 ) may have distinct forms depending on specific KE protocol, which are also determined by the forms of messages (in 1 , in 2 ) while running KE.EKGen.
In case both parties 'contribute' values which are used to computed the session key, i.e. k = esk ID2 and k = esk ID1 , this is very obvious as the contribution of ID 1 has to be transmitted to ID 2 and vice versa. However, if only one party ID c ∈ {ID 1 , ID 2 } decides on the session key esk IDc = k, then k has to securely be transferred to the other party (ID c ) via some form of encryption of k. In order to guarantee that only the single party ID c can decrypt the session key, the encryptor has to encrypt the session key exclusively for ID c using an ephemeral public key of ID c . As we do not rely on long-term keys, ID c has to generate this key freshly and send it to ID c as epk ID c in the first move of the key exchange protocol, resulting in ID c = ID 1 and ID c = ID 2 .
In order to model passive attacks we define an Execute(ID 1 , ID 2 ) query. The adversary can use the query to perform passive attacks in which the attacker initiates and eavesdrops on honest executions between parties ID 1 and ID 2 . Note that each identity should be uniquely chosen from the identity space IDS. By using this query the adversary can obtain the transcripts that were exchanged during the honest execution of the protocol. For each Execute(ID 1 , ID 2 ) query, an instance of KE protocol is executed between ID 1 and ID 2 . After simulation this query returns the transcript T of all messages exchanged in corresponding protocol instance and a session key 3 . κ , the security experiment is proceeded as a game between a challenger C and an adversary A based on a key exchange protocol KE, where the following steps are performed:
1. C generates a set of identities {ID 1 , . . . , ID } for potential protocol participants where ∈ N. A is given all identities as input and is allowed to interact with C via making Execute(ID i , ID j ) query at most d times for each party where d ∈ N and i, j ∈ [ ]. As response, C returns (T, K 0 ) to A. 2. At some point, A outputs a special symbol and a fresh protocol test instance and sends them to C. Given and test instance, C runs a new protocol instance and outputs the transcript T * and the session key K * 0 . Then, C samples K * 1 uniformly at random from the key space of the protocol, and tosses a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1}. Then C returns (T * , K * b ) to A. After that A may continually perform Execute(ID i , ID j ) queries. Finally, A may terminate with returning a bit b as output. 3. At the end of the experiment, 1 is returned if b = b; Otherwise 0 is returned.
In the following, we formally show that for every passively secure key exchange protocol after polynomially calls to KE.EKGen there cannot be any collisions among the ephemeral public keys generated by certain type of KE.EKGen. This lemma will be useful in the security proofs of our compilers to show that a compiler does not have to exchange additional random values after the KE run to guarantee that the transcripts which are authenticated with the authentication mechanism are unique. We can therefore discard the random values which are used in the JKSS compiler. Please note that for a two-move and two-party (ID 1 and ID 2 ) KE-protocol there exist at most two types of KE.EKGen algorithms which may be determined by input messages in 1 and in 2 . We here explicitly classify the algorithm KE.EKGen into two types denoted by KE.EKGen ID1 for party ID 1 and KE.EKGen ID2 for party ID 2 . While considering the collisions among ephemeral keys, let Coll denote the event that: after a polynomial number q times execution of KE.EKGen algorithm there exist at least two ephemeral public keys epk and epk generated by the ephemeral key generator KE.EKGen are identical, where the number q is determined by time t. Let probability coll denote the event Coll occurred within time t. We say all ephemeral keys generated by KE.EKGen are (q, t, coll )-distinct if those ephemeral keys are generated by KE.EKGen after q times execution of KE.EKGen algorithm within time t and there exists no collision among those ephemeral keys except for probability coll . For space reasons we only provide a sketch of the proof. Lemma 1. Assume KE is a (t, KE )-passively secure protocol without long-term key as defined above. Then all ephemeral public keys generated by KE.EKGen in the runs of KE are (q, t, coll )-distinct such that coll ≤ q · KE .
Proof. We first consider the case that the ephemeral keys are generated by different types of ephemeral key generators, i.e. KE.EKGen ID1 = KE.EKGen ID2 . Obviously, in this case there is no collision between ephemeral keys epk ID1 and epk ID2 , because those keys are assumed to be generated from different key spaces, so we only need to evaluate the collision probability among ephemeral keys generated by the same type of ephemeral key generators, i.e. KE.EKGen ID1 = KE.EKGen ID2 . For this case, we assume that with non-negligible probability coll there will be a collision among the epk ID1 after q protocol runs, or a collision among the epk ID2 after q protocol runs. According to the protocol specification the epk ID1 values are computed by randomized runs of KE.EKGen ID1 while the epk ID2 values have been computed by randomized runs of KE.EKGen ID2 . In particular, the computation of the epk ID1 and epk ID2 are deterministic in system parameters pms ke , message in 1 (resp. in 2 ) and the internal random coins ω ID1 used by ID 1 and ω ID2 used by ID 2 . The ω ID1 and ω ID2 are drawn uniformly random and in particular independently.
Let epk * ID1 and epk * ID2 be the ephemeral public keys that are exchanged in the test session and given, together with the challenge key k * b and transcript T * , to the adversary. Let esk * ID1 and esk * ID2 be the corresponding ephemeral secret keys. These keys have also been computed using KE.EKGen 1 (resp. KE.EKGen 2 ) with random coin ω ID1 (resp. ω ID2 ) and in 1 (resp. in 2 ). The adversary first guesses whether the collision occurs among the epk ID1 or the epk ID2 with probability ≥ 1/2. In the first case, the adversary can re-run KE.EKGen ID1 (q − 1) times with ω ID1,i and in 1,i to output {esk ID1,i , epk ID1,i } for i ∈ [1; q − 1] in time less than t. With the same probability coll it obtains two values epk ID1 , epk ID1 among the q values epk * ID1 , epk ID1,1 , . . . , epk ID1,(q−1) with epk ID1 = epk ID1 . Since it holds with probability ≥ 2/q that either epk ID1 = epk * ID1 or epk ID1 = epk * ID1 . In this case the adversary knows one pair (ω ID1,i , in 1,i ) that maps to epk * ID1 . Let esk ID1 be the corresponding ephemeral secret key. We now have to show that esk ID1 helps us to break the passive security. This simply follows from the determinism of KE.SKGen and correctness of KE. Since we have perfect correctness the adversary A can compute the session key k by using the ephemeral secret key esk ID1 and transcript T * . Next the adversary can compare whether k * b = k and correctly guess the value b. In case there is a collision among the epk ID2 the situation is similar. Hence, due to the security of KE protocol, we have that the probability bound coll q ≤ KE .
General KE Protocols
The above definition of KE, the corresponding security definition, and the results of the above lemma can easily be extended to y-move KE protocols. Concretely, besides the KE.Setup and KE.SKGen algorithms, each party may run at most y/2 different types of KE.EKGen algorithms in each protocol instance depending on the input messages in i : 1 ≤ i ≤ y. Namely, each session participant can call at most y/2 of times of KE.EKGen algorithms during protocol execution. We let each invocation of algorithm KE.
EKGen y (pms ke , in y )}. We could therefore apply the result of Lemma 1 to y-move KE protocols, namely with overwhelming probability there is for instance no collision among all epk ID b generated by KE.EKGen ID b with b ∈ {1, 2}.
Digital Signature Schemes
A digital signature scheme Σ is defined by three PPT algorithms (SIG.Gen, SIG.Sign, SIG.Vfy) with associated public/private key spaces {PK, SK}, message space M SIG and signature space S SIG in the security parameter κ:
this algorithm takes as input κ and outputs pk ∈ PK and sk ∈ SK; -σ $ ← SIG.Sign(sk, m): this algorithm generates a signature σ ∈ S SIG for m ∈ M SIG using signing key sk; -{0, 1} ← SIG.Vfy(pk, m, σ): this algorithm outputs 1 if σ is a valid signature for m under key pk, and 0 otherwise. 
, which can make up toueries to the signing oracle SIG(sk, ·) with arbitrary m; Output 1, if the following conditions are being held: 1. SIG.Vfy(pk, m * , σ * ) = 1, and 2. m * is not among the previously submitted to SIG(sk, ·) oracle; Output 0, otherwise; where SIG is a negligible function in κ, on input message m the oracle SIG(sk, ·) returns signature σ ← SIG.Sign(sk, m) and the number of queries q is bound by time t.
Definition 3 (Uniqueness). Let SIG = (SIG.Gen, SIG.Sign, SIG.Vfy) be a secure signature scheme with the security requirements in the above security experiment and let pk be the output of SIG.Gen algorithm. Let (m, σ) be a valid signature pair by a signature function SIG.Sign. We say that SIG is -unique if the probability that there exists a new signature σ = σ for which SIG.Vfy(vk, m, σ ) = 1 is at most . For perfectly unique if = 0.
Collision-Resistant Hash Functions
Let CRHF : K CRHF ×M CRHF → Y CRHF be a family of keyed-hash functions, where K CRHF is the key space, M CRHF is the message space and Y CRHF is the hash value space. The public key hk CRHF ∈ K CRHF defines a hash function, denoted by CRHF(hk CRHF , ·), which is generated by a PPT algorithm CRHF.KG(1 κ ) on input security parameter κ. On input a message m ∈ M CRHF , CRHF(hk CRHF , m) generates a hash value y ∈ Y CRHF .
Definition 4. CRHF is called (t CRHF , CRHF )-secure if all t CRHF -time adversaries
A have negligible advantage CRHF = CRHF (κ) with
where the probability is over the random coins of the adversary and CRHF.KG. If the hash key hk CRHF is obvious from the context, we write CRHF(m) for CRHF(hk CRHF , m).
A collision-resistant hash function CRHF is a deterministic algorithm which given a key k CRHF ∈ K CRHF and a bit string x outputs a hash value y = CRHF(k CRHF , x) in the hash space {0, 1} χ (with χ polynomial in κ). If k CRHF is clear from the context we write CRHF(·) short for CRHF(k CRHF , ·).
Definition 5. We say that CRHF is a (t, )-secure collision-resistant hash function, if any t-time adversary A that is given k CRHF $ ← K CRHF has an advantage of at most to compute two inputs (x, x ) with x = x and CRHF(x) = CRHF(x ).
Public Key Encryption Schemes
In our second compiler we can use a public key scheme (PKE) that satisfies security of indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2). A PKE scheme consists of three polynomial time algorithms (PKE.KGen, PKE.Enc, PKE.Dec) with the following semantics:
: is a probabilistic polynomial-time key generation algorithm which on input the κ security parameter κ in unary outputs a pair of encryption/decryption keys (pk, sk); -C $ ← PKE.Enc(pk, m): is a probabilistic polynomial-time encryption algorithm which takes as inputs a public key pk and a message m ∈ M PKE , outputs ciphertext C ∈ C PKE , where M PKE is a message space and C PKE is a ciphertext space.
-m ← PKE.Dec(sk, C): is a deterministic polynomial-time decryption algorithm which takes as input a key sk and a ciphertext C ∈ C PKE , and outputs either a message m ∈ M PKE or an error symbol ⊥.
Definition 6. We say that a public key encryption scheme PKE is (q, t, PKE )-secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks, if Pr[EXP ind−cca2 PKE,A (κ) = 1] ≤ 1/2 + PKE holds for all PPT adversaries A that make a polynomial number of oracle queries q while running in time at most t in the following experiment:
where PKE is a function in κ, and on input C the oracle DEC(sk, C) returns m ← PKE.Dec(sk, C) with the restriction that A is not allowed to query DEC(sk, ·) on the challenge ciphertext C * .
Message Authentication Code Schemes
We first recall the notions of general message authentication codes scheme. A message authentication code MAC consists of three algorithms (MAC.KGen, MAC.Tag, MAC.Vfy) with associated key space K MAC , message space M MAC and tag space T MAC .
The probabilistic key-generation algorithm takes as input a security parameter κ and outputs a secret key K MAC ∈ K MAC . -t tag ← MAC.Tag(K MAC , m): The algorithm MAC.Tag takes as input a secret key K MAC ∈ K MAC and a message m ∈ M MAC and outputs an authentication tag t tag ∈ T MAC . -b ∈ {0, 1} ← MAC.Vfy(K MAC , m, t tag ): The deterministic verification algorithm MAC.Vfy takes as input a secret key K MAC ∈ K MAC , a message m ∈ M MAC and a tag t tag ∈ T MAC and outputs b = 1 if it accepts. Otherwise, it returns b = 0.
Definition 7.
We say that a message authentication code scheme MAC is (q, t, MAC )-secure against forgeries under adaptive chosen-message attacks, if probability bound Pr[EXP MAC,A (κ) = 1] ≤ MAC holds for every PPT adversary A running in time at most t in the following experiment:
, which can make up toueries to oracle MAC(K, ·); Output 1, if it holds that
where MAC = MAC (κ) is a negligible function in the security parameter κ, on input message m the oracle MAC(K, m) returns tag t tag ← MAC.Tag(K, m) and the number of queries q is bound by time t.
Definition 8 (Uniqueness). Let MAC = (MAC.KGen, MAC.Tag, MAC.Vfy) be a secure MAC scheme with the security requirements in the above security experiment and let K MAC be the output of MAC.KGen algorithm. Let (m, t tag ) be a valid tag pair by tagging algorithm MAC.Tag. We say that MAC is -unique if the probability that there exists a new authentication tag t tag = t tag for which MAC.Vfy(K MAC , m, t tag ) = 1 is at most . For perfectly unique if = 0.
One-time message authentication code schemes We consider one-time message authentication code scheme OTMAC=(OTMAC.KGen, OTMAC.Tag, OTMAC.Vfy) to be three algorithms with associated key space K OTMAC , message space M OTMAC and tag space T OTMAC , where those algorithms have the same semantics as the regular MAC=(MAC.KGen, MAC.Tag, MAC.Vfy).
Definition 9. We say that a one-time message authentication scheme OTMAC is (t, OTMAC )-secure, if OTMAC is a (1, t, OTMAC )-secure message authentication code scheme in the sense of Definition 7.
Security Model
In this section we present a formal security model for a two-party PKI-based authenticated key-exchange (AKE) protocol. We follow the important line of research that was initiated by Bellare and Rogaway [2] , and later modified and extended in [6, 13, 15] . In these models the adversary is provided with an execution environment, which emulates the real-world capabilities of an active adversary.
Execution Environment. Let K ∈ {0, 1} κ be the key space of session keys, and {PK, SK} ∈ {0, 1} κ be key spaces of long-term public/private keys respectively. Fix a set of honest parties {P 1 , . . . , P } ∈ {0, 1} κ for ∈ N, where each honest party P i ∈ {P 1 , . . . , P } is a potential protocol participant and has a pair of longterm public/private key (pk i , sk i ) ∈ (PK, SK) that corresponds to its identity i. In order to formalize several sequential and parallel executions of the protocol, each party P i is characterized by a polynomial number of oracles {π s i } where s ∈ [d] is an index for a range such that d ∈ N. An oracle π s i represents a process in which the party P i executes the s-th protocol instance with access to the longterm key pair (pk i , sk i ) of party P i and to all public keys of the other parties. Moreover, we assume each oracle π s i maintains a list of independent internal state variables as described in Table 1 .
The internal state of each oracle π s i is initialized as (PID
, where ∅ denotes the empty string. We assume that the session key is assigned to the variable K i responds with the long-term private key sk i of party P i . If Corrupt(P i ) is the τ -th query issued by A, then we say that P i is τ -corrupted. For parties that are not corrupted we define τ := ∞.
-RegCorruptParty(pk c , P c ): This query allows A to register a new party P c ( < c < N), with a static public key pk c on behalf of P c . If the same party P c is already registered (either via RegCorruptParty-query or r ∈ [ ]), a failure symbol ⊥ is returned to A. Otherwise, P c is registered, the pair (P c , pk c ) is distributed to all other parties, and a symbol of success is returned. This query formalizes a malicious insider setting which can be used to model unknown key share (UKS) attacks and other chosen public key attacks [4, 18, 17] . We here formalize the arbitrary key registration policy via this query. Parties established by this query are called corrupted or adversary-controlled. -Reveal(π Security Definitions. We model the partnership of two oracles via the concept of matching conversations which was first introduced by Bellare and Rogaway [2] and later refined in [10, 14] . Let T 
Definition 10 (Matching Conversations
Definition 12 (Security Game). We formally consider a security experiment that is played between an adversary A and a challenger C. The challenger C implements the collection of oracles {π
At the beginning of the game, long-term public/private key pairs (pk i , sk i ) for each honest entity i are generated by C. The adversary receives public keys pk 1 , . . . , pk as input. Now the adversary may start issuing Send, RevealState, Corrupt, RegCorruptParty and Reveal queries, as well as one Test query at some point of the game. Finally, the adversary outputs a bit b and terminates.
For the security definition, we need the notion of freshness of oracles. -P i or P j has been established by the adversary A via the RegCorruptParty query, -P i is τ i -corrupted with τ i ≤ τ 0 and P j is τ j -corrupted with τ j ≤ τ 0 , -A has either made a RevealState(π Definition 14. We say that a two-party AKE protocol Σ is (t, )-secure, if for all adversaries A running the AKE security game within time t while having some negligible probability = (κ), it holds that:
1. When A terminates, there exists no τ 0 -fresh oracle π s i (except with probability ), such that -π s i has internal states Ω = accept and Ψ = j, and -there is no unique oracle π 
Authenticated Key Exchange Compile from Signature
In this section we present an efficient generic compiler that turns passively secure KE protocols as defined to AKE protocols fulfilling the security guarantees as specified in Section 4.
Protocol Description
The compiler takes as input the following building blocks: a passively secure key exchange protocol KE and a digital signature scheme SIG = (SIG.Gen, SIG.Sign, SIG.Vfy). Each party A is assumed to possess a pair of long-term keys generated as (sk A , pk A )
In the sequel, we will use the superscript 'A' to highlight the message recorded at party A (resp. party B). Session States: In the following we assume that the ephemeral secret vector esk used in each KE protocol instance will be stored in the variable STA. This is consistent with the usual distinction (made formal by providing different types of queries) between the compromise of long-term keys via the Corrupt query on the one hand and the session keys via the Reveal query on the other hand.
Security Analysis
Theorem 1. Assume that the KE protocol without long-term key is (t, KE )-passively secure (with respect to Definition 1), and the signature scheme SIG is unique and (q sig , t, SIG )-secure (with respect to Definition 3.3), then the above protocol is a (t , )-secure AKE protocol in the sense of Definition 14 with t ≈ t, and q sig ≥ d, and it holds that
We prove Theorem 1 in two stages. First, we show that the AKE protocol is a secure authentication protocol except for probability auth , that is, the protocol fulfills security property 1.) of the AKE definition. In the next step, we show that the session key of the AKE protocol is secure except for probability ind in the sense of the Property 2.) of the AKE definition. We require that q sig ≥ d, since we may need to correctly simulate all signatures for the d oracles of the party that is attacked in the security game. Then we have the overall probability that an adversary breaking the protocol is at most ≤ auth + ind . To prove the following lemmas, we proceed in games as in [19, 3] .
Lemma 2. For any adversary A running in time t ≈ t, the probability that there exists an oracle π Game 0. This is the original security game. We have that Pr[break (1) 0 ] = auth . Game 1. In this game, the challenger proceeds exactly like the challenger in Game 0, except that we add an abortion rule. The challenger raises event abort eph and aborts, if during the simulation an ephemeral key epk s i is computed by an oracle π s i but it has been sampled by another oracle π w u before with the same type of ephemeral key generator. From the result of Lemma 1, we know that the collision probability among ephemeral keys is related to the polynomial number of execution of KE.EKGen and the probability KE . Since there are d oracles at all each of which would execute one general KE.EKGen, therefore the event abort eph occurs with probability Pr[abort eph ] ≤ d · KE . We have that Pr[break (1) 0 ] ≤ Pr[break
Game 2. This game proceeds exactly as before, but the challenger raises event abort sig and aborts if the following condition holds:
-there exists a τ -fresh oracle π We have Pr[break
2 ] + Pr[abort sig ]. If the event abort sig happens with non-negligible probability, then we could construct a signature forger F as follows. The forger F receives a public key pk * as input, and runs the adversary A as a subroutine simulating the challenger for A. It first guesses an index θ $ ← [ ] pointing to the public key for which the adversary is able to forge, and sets pk ID θ = pk * . Next F generates all other long-term public/secret keys honestly like the challenger in the previous game. Then the F proceeds as the challenger in Game 2, except that it uses its chosen-message oracle to generate a signature under pk ID θ for the oracles of party ID θ .
When abort sig is raised, this means the adversary A has forged a signature on behalf of an uncorrupted party ID j . If the simulator guessed the party ID j the adversary attacked (such that θ = j) correctly, which happens with probability 1/ , then the F can use the signature received by π s i to break the EUF-CMA security of the underlying signature scheme with success probability SIG . The event abort sig happens with the probability Pr[abort sig ] ≤ SIG . Therefore we have Pr[break
2 ] + · SIG . Note that the RegCorruptParty query does not affect security, since all registered identities should be distinct to the identities of honest parties. So in Game 2 each accepting oracle π s i has a unique 'partner' oracle π t j sharing the same transcript T 1 . With respect to other queries, they will be simulated honestly as in the previous game without any modification since those values are not used for authentication. Therefore we have Pr[break (1) 2 ] = 0. Sum up probabilities from Game 0 to Game 2, we proved Lemma 2.
Lemma 3. For any adversary A running in time t ≈ t, the probability that A correctly answers the Test-query is at most 1/2 + ind with
where all quantities are as the same as stated in the Theorem 2.
Proof. Let break (2) δ denote the event that the A correctly guesses the bit b sampled by the Test-query in Game δ, and Test(π s * i ) is the τ -th query of A, and π s * i is a τ -fresh oracle that is ∞-revealed throughout the security game. Let Adv δ := Pr[break (2) δ ] − 1/2 denote the advantage of A in Game δ. Consider the following sequence of games.
Game 0. This is the original security game. Thus we have that Pr[break (2) 0 ] = ind + 1/2 = Adv 0 + 1/2. Game 1. The challenger C in this game proceeds as before, which aborts if the test oracle accepts without unique partner oracle. Thus we have
where auth is an upper bound on the probability that there exists an oracle that accepts without unique partner oracle in the sense of Definition 14 (cf. Lemma 2). We have now excluded active adversaries between test oracle and its partner oracle. 2 . Thus we have that
Game 3. Finally, we replace the key k * of the test oracle π s * i and its partner oracle π t * j with the same random value k * . If there exists an adversary A who can distinguish this game from the previous game, then we use it to construct an algorithm B to break the passive security of key exchange protocol KE as follows. Assuming that the adversary B interacts with the challenger C KE via Execute query which simulates the passive security game as in the security definition of key exchange. More specifically, B simulates the challenger in this game for A which is illustrated as follows:
-At the beginning of the game, B implements the collection of oracles {π
All long-term public/private key pairs (pk IDi , sk IDi ) for each honest entity i are generated honestly. The adversary A receives the public keys pk ID1 , . . . , pk ID as input. The simulation of B is perfect since B can always correctly answer all queries from A. In particular for those RevealState queries, B can answer them using those ephemeral secret keys esk s i chosen by himself. If A is able to correctly answer the bit b of Test-query with non-negligible probability, so does the adversary B (which breaks the passive security of the KE protocol). Exploiting the security of key exchange protocol, we obtain that
In this game, the response to the Test query always consists of a uniformly random key, which is independent to the bit b flipped in the Test query. Thus we have Adv 3 = 0. Lemma 3 is proved by putting together of probabilities from Game 0 to Game 3.
Authenticated Key Exchange Compile from Public Key Encryption
In this section we present a public key encryption based AKE compiler that turns passively secure key exchange protocols as defined to AKE protocols fulfilling the security guarantees as specified in Section 4.
Protocol Description
The compiler takes the following building blocks as input: a passively secure key exchange protocol KE, a public encryption scheme PKE, a collision resistant hash function CRHF and a one-time message authentication scheme OTMAC.
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Protocol Execution: The compiled protocol between two parties A and B proceeds as follows, which is also depicted in Figure 3. 1. First, A and B run the key exchange protocol KE, then both parties obtain the key k from the key exchange phase (as the session key of AKE protocol) and record the transcripts as T Session States: We assume the ephemeral secret vector esk used in each KE protocol instance and the random key K A and K B used by PKE.Enc will be stored in the variable STA.
Security Analysis
In this section, we present our results for the PKE-based compiler.
Theorem 2. Assume that the KE protocol without long-term key is (t, KE )-secure (with respect to Definition 1), the public key encryption scheme PKE is (q pke , t, PKE )-secure (IND-CCA2) (with respect to Definition 3.5), the hash function CRHF is (t, CRHF )-secure (with respect to Definition 3.4), and the onetime authentication code scheme OTMAC is unique and (t, OTMAC )-secure (with respect to Definition 3.6). Then the above protocol is a (t , )-secure AKE protocol in the sense of Definition 14 with t ≈ t and q pke ≥ d and holds that
